COMMENT cause they are not interested in repeat customers. 22 The majority of counterfeit goods finally reach consumers through street vendors, flea markets, and discount stores. 2 3 Yet they can damage consumers indirectly through incidents like plane crashes or auto accidents.
This Comment evaluates the effectiveness of the criminal penalties for trademark counterfeiting invoked in the Trademark Counterfeiting Act of 1984 through an analysis of caselaw and current literature. This Comment suggests that such penalties are potentially the most powerful deterrent against trademark counterfeiting in the United States, but to date inadequate enforcement has undercut their effectiveness. It suggests that the problem of trademark counterfeiting is significant enough to warrant a greater role for federal law enforcement authorities in the investigation and prosecution of trademark counterfeiters. Part II of this Comment discusses the history of trademark counterfeiting and criminal sanctions, as well as the Act's criminal provisions and the judicial response to them. Part III discusses the current alternatives to the Act, including international efforts pursued by the United States, Customs enforcement, state anti-counterfeiting criminal laws, and the civil remedies under the Act. Finally, Part IV discusses the need for increased criminal prosecutions under the Act.
II. TRADEMARK COUNTERFEITING AND CRIMINAL LAWS TO COMBAT THE PROBLEM

A.
THE HISTORY OF TRADEMARK COUNTERFEITING Trademarks have been in use for centuries, and counterfeiting of trademarks has always been a problem:
The Greeks marked their works of art with the name of the sculptor. Greek pottery from the earliest times has borne inscriptions, usually the name of the maker and on decorated pieces the name of the decorator. The cup handles from the Ceramicus of Athens beside the 22 Crandall, supra note 12, at 33 ("Because they are not out for repeat business, they cut corners on quality, safety and cleanliness to produce their fakes as cheaply as possible."). It isn't just street vendors who sell counterfeits. Discount stores may knowingly or unknowingly stock their shelves with bogus goods. In addition to legitimately obtained close-out merchandise, they may carry counterfeit designer brands made by renegade contractors who at one time legitimately produced goods for a company, then kept patterns and went into business for themselves. Even reputable stores are not immune. Rip-off artists return the fake counterfeit of a genuine product for the refund. Id.
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maker's name often bore real trade marks as figures of Mercury staffs, oil jugs, bees, lions' heads, and the like. Greek inscriptions have been found on Etruscan vases dated from 800 to 400 B.C. This has suggested the question whether these vases were truly a Greek product, or whether the Etruscan potter had copied the trade mark of some celebrated Greek maker, as the Roman engravers and sculptors were in the habit of doing in later times.
4
Medieval artisans used trademarks extensively to identify their goods. 2 5 Counterfeiters in medieval times copied many items, particularly the trademarks of publishers on the covers of books. Edward Rogers, an original drafter of the Lanham Act, 28 which still governs the vast majority of trademark law today, suggested at the beginning of this century that the use of trademarks throughout history is a reflection of market conditions. For instance, when goods are produced in a localized setting, quality assurances are made through the interaction of consumer and producer. However, when goods are mass produced and distributed on a wider basis, beyond the localized setting, the use of marks becomes necessary as a source indicator to assure the quality of the goods purchased. 29 Consequently, at the beginning of the twentieth century, when commercial activities had significantly expanded over the past several decades, the use of trademarks had also increased "as either the cause or the effect of modern advertising. ' 3 0 People began to rely more and more on trademarks as a source indicator and an assurance of quality. Trademark counterfeiting consequently became a potentially more serious problem as there were more trademarks to counterfeit and more consumers who were vulnerable to such activity. Increased demand for certain trademarks only served to exacerbate the vulnerability of consumers. For example, during 24 Rogers, Some Historical Matter Concerning Trademarks, 9 MICH. L. REv 
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COMMENT Prohibition, when there were severe restrictions on alcohol supply but a steady demand for certain high quality spirits, a fake alcohol industry thrived and eventually led to the paralyzation of the hands and feet of 15,000 drinkers in 1930 alone. 3 ' As the economy grew, counterfeiting affected many other products. In the 1930s there were reports of fake aspirin, ginger ale, razors, auto parts, cigars, and deodorant, while in the 1950s fake polio vaccines and in the 1960s phony helicopter parts highlighted the news. 3 2 By the mid1970s, a boom in counterfeiting occurred as consumers took a great interest in designer marks and labels. 3 3 At the beginning of the 1980s, the demand for marks of all types increased, and the counterfeiters responded in kind. THE HISTORY OF CRIMINAL STATUTES AGAINST TRADEMARK
COUNTERFEITING
Some form of law or custom has been invoked to stop trademark counterfeiting probably since Roman times. 3 5 The first recorded criminal anti-counterfeiting laws arose in medieval times:
As early as the thirteenth century, the copying of valuable marks became so common and so injurious that infringement was made a misdemeanor and in some cases even a felony and was punished in the barbarous manner characteristic of the times. The Elector of Palantine in the Fourteenth Century [sic] issued an edict which, after reciting that the sale of spurious wine was the most outrageous form of deceit, punished by hanging any innkeeper who sold ordinary wine as Rudesheimer.
3 6
In modern times, the United States has been slow in protecting intellectual property rights. 211 (1986) (noting the popularity of such labels as Izod and Calvin Klein and the "snob" appeal, analyzed in economic terms, that goes into labels when they are treated as status symbols). 34 Rakoff & Wolff, supra note 20, at 150 (Counterfeiting markets shadow the success of a legitimate mark, and sometimes outstrip the growth in production of the legitimate mark as the production of a counterfeit is more profitable. The Trade-Mark Cases consolidated the cases of three defendants indicted for the possession with the-intent to defraud of counterfeit trademarks for champagne and whiskey. 42 The indictments fell under sections four and five of the 1876 Act criminalizing trademark counterfeiting. 43 The issue of the case concerned the constitutionality of the 1870 Act. 44 The prosecution urged that the Act was valid as an exercise of congressional power to regulate under the commerce clause of the Constitution. 45 The Court, however, ruled that the 1870 Act was unconstitutional on the grounds that Congress had erroneously based the authority of the Act on the Consti-MARK REP. 121, 129-30 (1978) (The 1870 Act provided for damages and injunctive relief as remedies for counterfeiting any registered mark.).
39 Congress enacted the statutes to provide reciprocal protection for intellectual property to countries with whom the U.S. had treaties, and to protect the manufacturers and merchants who had lobbied for the passage of the measures. Derenberg, 
[Vol. 80
TRADEMARK COUNTERFEITING an individual first offender. 58 A repeat offender may be sentenced to fifteen years in prison or a $1,000,000 fine or both. 59 Corporations may be fined $1,000,000 for the first offense, and $5,000,000 for a second offense.
60
The sanctions apply to "[w]homever intentionally traffics or attempts to traffic in goods or services and knowingly uses a counterfeit mark on or in connection with such goods or services." 61 The first element, trafficking in counterfeit goods, is defined as using, or intending to use, a mark in commerce "as consideration for anything of value." 6 2 Thus, the purchase of counterfeit items for personal use is not penalized under the Act.
63
The prosecution must also demonstrate that the mark in question is indeed counterfeit. The Act defines a counterfeit mark as:
(A) a spurious mark-(i) that is used in connection with trafficking in goods or services; (ii) that is identical with, or substantially indistinguishable from, a mark registered for those goods or services on the principal register in the United States Patent and Trademark Office and in use, whether or not the defendant knew such mark was so registered; and (iii) the use of which is likely to cause confusion, to cause mistake, or to deceive .... 64 the first subpart of the definition requires showing that the mark is used "in connection with [the] trafficking of goods." Trafficking is usually established simply by purchasing a counterfeit good from the defendant prior to his or her arrest. The second subpart of the counterfeit definition includes the requirement that the mark in question be "substantially indistinguishable" from the genuine mark. This definition does not require that the mark be exactly identical to the genuine mark registered with the Patent and Trademark Office.
6 6 The term "substantially indistinguishable" is not defined by the Act; rather, it is determined COMMENT on a case-by-case basis, 6 7 and a prosecutor can establish it through the use of expert testimony.
8
The final subpart of the definition of a counterfeit mark requires a showing that the mark in question is "likely to cause confusion, to cause mistake, or to deceive." This standard incorporates the wording of the Lanham Act "to ensure that no conduct will be criminalized by the Act that does not constitute trademark infringement under the Lanham Act." 6 9 Thus, the standards established by civil cases for determining confusion under the Lanham Act should be used to determine the standards for confusion in criminal cases under the Trademark Counterfeiting Act. 70 In United States v. Torkington, 7 ' for example, the Eleventh Circuit followed the Lanham Act cases in recognizing a cause of action based on the possibility of post-sale confusion. In so holding, the Eleventh Circuit disposed of the district court's assertion that the price disparity between the genuine and counterfeit goods in question, which in Torkington were counterfeit Rolex watches, eliminated any actionable confusion.
72
Such price disparity was relevant only to the direct sale context, and not to the post-sale context. After establishing the three subparts of the definition of a counterfeit mark, the prosecution must establish two mental elements under the Act: intentional trafficking and knowing use of a counterfeit mark. 7 4 The government can prove the intentional trafficking element by showing that defendant sold or obtained the goods in question " 'on purpose' -75 through, for instance, a purchase of counterfeit goods from the defendant prior to his or her arrest. The knowledge element of the use of a counterfeit mark is a little more difficult to prove, as the prosecution must show that the defendant had "an awareness or a firm belief" that the mark was coun- Certain goods are exempt from the Act. For instance, gray market goods 7 9 are exempt because current Treasury Department regulations allow for their importation. 80 Also, if a licensee manufactures too much of a good under a valid trademark licensing agreement, those "overruns" are not considered counterfeit goods because of the owner's initial approval. 8 ' Congress' rationale for the overrun exception is as follows: " 'The trademark owner has put the wheels in motion for the manufacturer to make the overruns, and has the means to protect himself or herself... The contractual and other civil remedies already existing make it inappropriate to criminalize such practices.' "82 The overrun exception does not apply, however, if the licensee uses the mark for goods not covered by the licensing agreement. 8 3 Trade dress 84 is also not covered by the Act unless it is registered as a trademark.
Finally, defendants have the same affirmative defenses available to them in a criminal counterfeiting case as they do in a civil one. For instance, the defendant has the burden of proving the affirmative defenses of laches and anti-trust violations by a preponderence of the evidence. Sentencing under the Act is discretionary within the scope of the United States Sentencing Guidelines. 8 7 The legislative history stresses that an appropriate deterrent would include a combination of a prison term and fines. 88 The drafters of the Act recognized, however, that the imposition of the maximum fines would be unlikely except for the most egregious forms of counterfeiting. 8 9 77 Joint Statement, supra note 2, at H12076. 78 Id. at H12077. 79 Gray market goods are defined as "trademarked goods legitimately manufactured and sold overseas and then imported into the United States outside the trademark owner's desired distribution channels." Joint Statement, supra note 2, H 12079.
80 Id.; see K-Mart v. Cartier, 485 U.S. 191 (1988) (reaffirming the legality of Treasury regulations that permit the entry of gray market goods into the United States).
81 Joint Statement, supra note 2, at H12079 (citation omitted). 
The Supreme Court of the United States has not ruled on the validity of the Act, but the Second, 90 Fifth, 9 1 Eighth, 9 2 and Eleventh 93 Circuits have all consistently upheld criminal convictions under its provisions against a variety of challenges. 94 The reported cases interpreting the Act are few in number and focus almost exclusively on counterfeit watches, in particular those of Rolex U.S.A. 95 1989) (LEXIS, Genfed library, Dist. file), the United States Sentencing Guidelines recommended a sentence of 8-14 months imprisonment for trafficking in over $50,000 worth of counterfeit watches. The defendant received a sentence of 36-months probation and a $6,000 fine; the court stressed that one of the mitigating factors in this case was that the defendant posed no danger to society. Id.
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Of the ten reported cases only one deals with another counterfeit good, Mets' baseball souvenirs. 96 One unreported case 9 7 deals with a dangerous counterfeit good and the FBI's role in a sting operation to catch the defendant by posing as a potential buyer.
98
The precise number of unreported cases is difficult to determine. The arrest or prosecution of counterfeiters of potentially dangerous goods is often publicized in the popular press. 99 If the number of published reports in the popular press is an accurate indicator, there are not many unreported cases of dangerous goods under the Act. Even if there are many more unreported counterfeiting cases, the lack of publicity lessens the impact of their deterrent value. To date, the criminal sanctions of the Act have not been a significant deterrent in the marketplace. 10 0 More criminal prosecutions are needed to increase the Act's deterrent value, 10 ' especially against the production of dangerous goods. 101 James Bikoff, an attorney in Washington, D.C., who represents trademark owners, stated in 1988 that "there remains a need for criminal prosecutions of commercial counterfeiters to create the necessary deterrent to commercial counterf6iting." Bikoff, supra note 89.
III. ALTERNATIVES TO THE CRIMINAL PROVISIONS OF THE
102 Before the Trademark Counterfeiting Act of 1984 and even today, federal authorities have had the right to prosecute trademark counterfeiters for a variety of federal crimes including: mail fraud, 18 U.S.C. § 1341 (1988) (maximum penalty of a $1,000 fine or five years imprisonment or both); wire fraud, 18 U.S.C. § 1343 (maximum penalty of a $1,000 fine or five years imprisonment or both); defrauding the United States, 18 U.S.C. § 1002 (maximum penalty of $10,000 or five years imprisonment or both); transportation of stolen goods worth over $5,000, 18 U.S.C. § 2314 (maximum penalty of $10,000 fine or 10 years imprisonment or both); and the receipt of stolen goods worth over $5,000, 18 U.S.C. § 2315 (maximum penalty of $10,000 fine or 10 years imprisonment or both).
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COMMENT To underscore its desire to eradicate international counterfeiting, the United States has codified its desire to negotiate with foreign governments over the enactment and enforcement of trademark laws within their countries."1 8 To stem the tide of counterfeit goods entering the country, the United States government has taken steps to work within the international framework. The first step in international efforts was joining the Paris Convention for the Protection of Industrial Property ("Paris Convention")." 19 The ninety-nine member Paris Convention has provided a foundation for minimal protection against trademark counterfeiting 120 through provisions which prohibit the use, registration, and importation of confusing trademarks, and sanction their seizure and forfeiture where allowed by national law. 121 The Paris Convention does not mandate that a signatory country follow specific guidelines; it merely requires that the country grant the same trademark protection to other signatory members as it does to its own nationals, 12 2 a standard that provides little relief to trademark owners in countries with few anti-counterfeiting laws. Thus, the United States must look to other international sources to protect trademark owners and consumers from counterfeiting. 
820
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One such source is the World Intellectual Property Organization ("WIPO"),123 which became a specialized United Nations agency in 1974,124 and oversees the Paris Convention and thirteen other agreements involving industrial and intellectual property.
12 5 WIPO has a committee of experts which meets annually to discuss measures aimed at fighting trademark counterfeiting. During one such conference, the committee formulated a draft model provision of an anti-counterfeiting code. 1 26 The committee of experts hoped that the provision would direct attention to the counterfeiting problem, and provide countries with information that would aid in the implementation of national anti-counterfeiting laws.' 27 The WIPO was unable to develop a final set of provisions, however, in part because of disagreement between delegates over how they should incorporate the Paris Convention into the new draft.1 28 Such discord, especially between developing and industrial countries, continually threatens the potential of ever creating an anti-counterfeiting code The United States, Japan, and the European Economic Community are currently supporting measures designed to achieve an agreement among the members of GATT on the creation and enforcement of laws designed to protect intellectual property in both domestic and international markets.' 3 5 However, a group of mostly developing countries, led by Brazil, is resisting a GATT intellectual property accord, asserting that WIPO is the proper forum for such agreements 3 6 and that bringing in intellectual property issues would distract GATT from its other tasks. But, even if a GATT agreement is reached in the current round of negotiations, it will be slow to take effect. 1 40 Furthermore, it or any other international agreement may not be enforced by the countries that have most of the counterfeiting because of their general opposition. Thus, international efforts by the United States to secure the protection of trademarks from counterfeiting, through international conventions and organizations, may be stymied altogether by the countries that foster counterfeiting.
C. UNILATERAL EFFORTS OF THE UNITED STATES IN THE INTERNATIONAL SPHERE
The United States does have some unilateral negotiating leverage when dealing with individual countries with a counterfeiting problem. The Generalized System of Preferences ("GSP"),1 4 1 for instance, grants duty-free treatment to certain products of developing countries. Investigations into developing countries receiving GSP benefits are conducted by the United States Trade Representative ("USTR") upon its own initiative, or through petitions from private parties. 1 4 2 Upon an annual review, GSP treatment can be suspended, withheld, or withdrawn if it is discovered through an investigation that a developing country does not adequately safeguard intellectual property rights.1 43 For instance, the President, upon the USTR's recommendation and investigation, denied Thailand's re- The developing countries have other fears: These countries have also expressed the fear that anticounterfeit rules would be used by industrialized countries as a protectionist measure, thereby limiting importation of legitimate goods.... It was also reported that several developing nations took the view that the enactment of anti-counterfeiting rules within G.A.T.T. would simply reinforce the power of multinational corporations. 
Id.
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COMMENT quest for additional duty-free status because of its failure to provide adequate intellectual property laws.1 44 Such a denial is supposed to encourage the country to improve its protection of intellectual property. Denying GSP benefits will not be as effective a tool as it once was, however, because some of the most notorious counterfeiting nations, including Taiwan, Hong Kong, South Korea, and Singapore, have been removed from duty-free treatment because "'their recent improvements in competitiveness'" demonstrate that they do not need such assistance. 145 These countries represented sixty percent of all U.S. GSP eligible benefits.' 46 Thus, the effectiveness of withholding GSP benefits has diminished considerably.
Remedies 
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which allows for the exclusion from the United States 5 7 or the forfeiture or both of goods deemed counterfeit. 158 The International Trade Commission ("ITC") conducts investigations under section 337 on its own impetus or through a sworn complaint from the trademark owner. 159 The ITC's swift proceedings 160 and avoidance of the usual jurisdictional and enforcement problems often present in suits against foreign entities 16 1 are distinct advantages to a trademark owner. In addition, a trademark owner can pursue other legal actions simultaneously in the courts, as well as through the ITC under section 337, and is not precluded from suing in another forum if relief is denied. 162 Although the ability to maintain an action in the courts and through the ITC may seem like a powerful weapon in theory, in practice it may prove too expensive for the trademark owner to maintain both actions. As with GSP and section 301 actions, a valid complaint taken up with the ITC may be stymied by the whims of foreign policy as the President of the United States retains a veto power over any action.
163
None of the three aforementioned unilateral measures have been imposed with any frequency to trademark counterfeiting. Even if they were, it is difficult to compel the enforcement of a new law: if the country does attempt to uphold the new law, then counterfeiters may merely move to a country where the laws are less stringent. 164 Even the United States, for example, has problems en-(a) (I) (A) Unfair methods of competition and unfair acts in the importation of articles.., into the United States, or in the sale of such articles by the owner, iinporter, or consignee, the threat of which is-(i) to destroy or substantially injure an industry in the United States; (ii) to prevent the establishment of such an industry ; or (iii) to restrain or monopolize trade and commerce in the United States.... 
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COMMENT forcing its anti-counterfeiting laws. Another problem is that worldwide counterfeiting networks sometimes employ sophisticated distribution techniques. 1 6 5 Most countries probably have neither the sophistication nor the resources to uncover the discrete role that their country serves in an international counterfeiting scheme, or the standing to prosecute all the participants. For instance, in one perfume counterfeiting ring, "the bottles came from Italy and Spain, packaging was done in Mexico and England, and the money came from the United States through the Channel Islands."' 66 Thus, the end result is that pressuring individual countries through unilateral efforts may not make much of a dent in an international problem. Furthermore, unilateral remedies tend to antagonize the targeted countries. 167 The United States faces problems with these remedies at the GATT negotiations. A GATT panel has already determined that section 337 is inconsistent with GATT's equanimity principles in its "failure to provide identical procedures and standards for the enforcement of patent rights for domestic and foreignproduced goods,"' 168 and section 301 will probably suffer the same fate soon. 16 9 The adverse reactions by many countries to these unilateral methods at GATT may compel the United States to modify sections 337170 and 301 in the interest of reaching an agreement. At a minimum, it may lead the President to exercise his veto more frequently over such unilateral actions in order to avoid more confrontations while GATT negotiations proceed. Thus, the potency of unilateral remedies, hampered already by the sophistication of counterfeiters, is in danger of being further compromised.
D. CUSTOMS
United States Customs 17 1 enforces most of the unilateral penal- Articles bearing counterfeit trademarks: (a) Definition. A "counterfeit trademark" is a spurious trademark which is identical with, or substantially indistinguishable from, a registered trademark. Id.
179 Chiles, supra note 9, at 39 (Apple Computer provided customs inspectors with kits to identify counterfeits of its trademarks and copyrights.).
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COMMENT volves coordinated operations with agents from the FBI, FDA, and other governmental agencies. 180 The agency has the right to confiscate and destroy counterfeits of goods registered with customs.' 8 1
With the trade volume so high, however, and the difficulty of distinguishing the counterfeit from the authentic, customs agents do not at present have the ability to halt most of the importation of counterfeit goods. The understaffing of custom's agents at domestic ports, because of budget constraints, is a major factor contributing to this inability.1 8 2 Furthermore, according to Patrick O'Brien, then assistant regional commissioner for United States Customs in New York, trademark counterfeiting is "not our No. 1 priority"-it is the number four priority "[after] narcotics, technology exporting and illegal arms sales."' 18 3
Another problem concerns the understaffing of the Customs Bureau abroad, particularly in counterfeiting hotspots of the Pacific rim. Agents abroad can help identify incoming shipments of counterfeit goods to the United States through undercover investigations and other activities and can work with foreign governments in stemming the tide of such illegal shipments. The Bureau is understaffed abroad because of both the reluctance of many United States embassies to hold open one of their personnel slots for a customs officer and general budget cuts.
18 4 Thus, it seems that trademark owners cannot rely on the customs service to adequately protect their trademarks from international counterfeiting, even with the cooperation of the trademark owners themselves. The success of such a seminar program in terms of stemming counterfeiting remains to be proven, but the participation and interest of the Taiwanese demonstrate some potential for the success of such a non-confrontational approach. Seminars may well prove more successful than the United States government's attempts to pressure nations through sections 301 and 337 or through GSP actions. Such pressure tactics may just entrench those developing nations that do not favor heavy-handed treatment. Once again, however, it may be beyond the capabilities of developing countries to combat the problem given the scope of the counterfeiting trade. To be successful, such conferences must include the participation and cooperation of all or at least most of the developing countries where there is a counterfeiting problem, lest the counterfeiters just move from country to country. The failures and uncertainty of international efforts to curb the importation of counterfeit goods places emphasis on the enforcement of domestic anti-counterfeiting laws.
E. EFFORTS OF PRIVATE INDUSTRY AND THE GOVERNMENT
ing Coalition ("IAC"). With a membership of over 300 major manufacturers, the IAC has successfully pressured Congress into giving customs officials the right to seize suspected counterfeit goods. Fleming, The Bogus Brands Boom, WORLD PRESS REv., Apr., 1985, at 50. It was also very active in the formulation of model drafts for the Trademark Counterfeiting Act. Rakoff & Wolff, supra note 20, at 147 n. 12. Another organization, "[t]he Paris-based International Chamber of Commerce (ICC), which has 7,000 member corporations and associations in 100 countries, has created a Counterfeiting Intelligence Bureau. With a staff of three investigators and an annual budget of $65,000, the bureau will attempt to track down counterfeiters for its clients." Fleming, supra, at 50. Such a small budget and staff, however, will probably undercut the effectiveness of this bureau. The court ruled against a restrictive reading of the criminal simulation statute that would limit the statute to unique chattels, such as paintings or antiques, and held that there was nothing in the language of the statute which barred its application to the altering of a modern, commercially manufactured product.' 9 9 More precisely, the 'court said that the simulation statute was designed to protect the consumer, and as such should be construed broadly to include a variety of product counterfeiting. 20 0 The court followed the suggestions of the Model Penal Code of the American Law Institute.
1
Similarly in People v. Hafif, 202 the New York Criminal Court held that the wording of a criminal simulation statute, similar to the one in Frampton, may extend to include watches and other commercially mass-produced items, including the falsely stamped jewelry in this case. 203 The court stated that the statute was geared toward forgery of written documents and instruments, but was extended to cover "'fraudulent simulation of furniture, paintings, jewels, and (a) He makes or alters an object in whole or in part so that it appears to have value because of age, antiquity, rarity, source, or authorship that it does not have; or (b) He sells, passes, or otherwise utters an object so made or altered; or (c) He possesses an object so made or altered with intent to sell, pass, or otherwise utter it; or (d) He authenticates or certifies an object so made or altered as genuine or as different from what it is. (2) Criminal simulation is punishable as follows:
(a) If the value defrauded or intended to be defrauded is less than $100, the offense is a class B misdemeanor.
(b) If the value defrauded or intended to be defrauded exceeds $100 but is less than $1,000, the offense is a class A misdemeanor.
(c) If the value defrauded or intended to be defrauded exceeds $1,000 but is less than $2,500, the offense is a felony of the third degree.
(d) If the value defrauded or intended to be defrauded exceeds $2,500, the offense is a felony of the second degree." UTAH CODE ANN. § 76-6-518 (1978) 
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COMMENT other objects.' ",204 The court also stated that "the purpose of the statute is to protect consumers." 20 5
Frampton and Hafif represent the total number of reported state trademark counterfeiting cases for at least the last fourteen years. 20 6 There are undoubtedly unreported opinions, including cases where the defendant plea bargained. 20 7 Nevertheless, such a small number of reported cases strongly suggests that the state statutes criminalizing trademark counterfeiting are underused. According to Craig 0. Correll, then Associate General Counsel of Ocean Pacific, Ltd., "[1]ocal police agencies and prosecutors are unfamiliar with these laws. Enforcement of obscure criminal codes is discretionary; law enforcement agencies can and do decline to become involved." 20 8 Moreover, many district attorneys do not realize that trademark counterfeiting is a criminal offense; it is difficult to convince them to devote their resources to something they consider a civil matter.
9
Most of the burden thus falls on the trademark owner to achieve results under state statutes. The trademark owner, however, does not normally have the same training or expertise in investigating criminals as do the local law enforcement agents. In fact, "very few manufacturers of trademarked goods employ in-house counsel and investigators to deal with their counterfeiting problems," 2 10 and outside counsel to trademark owners tend to use civil remedies with which they are more accustomed. 2 1 ' The state anti-counterfeiting criminal laws thus fall short of protecting consumers and trademark owners alike from counterfeiters. 2 2 1 the harm to the trademark owner from the counterfeiting outweighs the potential harm of the seizure to the person against whom it is ordered; 22 2 and the defendant with notice would "destroy, move, hide, or otherwise make such matter inaccessible to the court. ' "223 An applicant can satisfy the "inaccessible" element by describing the defendant's past efforts to avoid judicial process. 224 "The Act follows the prior practice of allowing seizure orders to be issued against 'John Doe' defendants when the sellers of counterfeit goods are transitory, unidentifiable defendants, such as itinerant street peddlers and sellers at swap meets and flea markets."
22 5
Besides the counterfeit goods, the applicant also can seize the counterfeiter's "means of making such marks, and records documenting the manufacture, sale, or receipt of things involved. ' 226 Such records help in proving the case against the defendant and in discovering the scope of the counterfeiting, which may in turn lead to seizures and suits against other identified counterfeiters. Reasonable prior notice of the seizure must also be afforded the local United States Attorney. 2 2 7 In addition, a bond must be posted to cover the possibility of a wrongful seizure. 228 A victim who suffers damage from a wrongful seizure can recover "lost profits, cost of the materials, loss of good will and punitive damages in instances where the seizure was sought in bad faith, and, unless the court finds extenuating circumstances ... a reasonable attorney's fee." 2 29
The court also has the option of awarding prejudgment interest.
30
Thus, the trademark owner must conduct a careful investigation of once the applicant establishes the use of a counterfeit mark. Smith, Obtaining Early and
